Posts Tagged ‘bin ladin’

The Black Flags of Khurasan

September 1, 2014

Bismillah al-Rahman al-Rahim

With the Name of God, All-Merciful, Most Merciful

PROPHECIES ABOUT THE ARMIES OF THE BLACK FLAGS OR BANNERS FROM KHURASAN AND THE EAST

Ottoman soldiers carry a black military flag or banner during the First World War

Ottoman soldiers carry a black military flag or banner during the First World War

Usama Hasan

1st September, 2014

(minor updates: 26/10/2014)

 The Black Flags of Khurasan (PDF)

Contents

1       SUMMARY. 2

2       Fabricated hadiths: pro- and anti- ‘Abbasid propaganda. 3

2.1         Pro-Abbasid fabrications. 3

2.2         Anti-Abbasid fabrications. 4

3       Weak hadiths about the black flags or banners from Khurasan. 5

3.1         Shawkani’s brief analysis. 7

3.2         Albani’s analysis of this hadith. 7

3.2.1          [Ibn Taymiyya on the allegedly blasphemous nature of the term, “caliph of God”]. 8

3.3         Conclusion. 9

4       Contemporary propaganda about black flags. 10

4.1         The Ottomans. 10

4.2         Bin Ladin. 10

4.3         The Taliban. 10

4.4         Harmajdun (Armageddon). 10

4.5         Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT). 10

4.6         The Boston Bombers. 11

4.7         The Ahmadiyya. 11

4.8         Contemporary Jihadist groups. 11

 

1. SUMMARY

  1. Several hadiths or traditions in Sunni Muslim sources speak of the appearance of an army carrying black flags or banners from the East, specifically Khurasan (Khorasan), in support of an apocalyptic messianic figure, the Mahdi, at the end of time.
  2. Historic Khorasan is largely in modern-day Afghanistan, but parts of it are in modern-day Iran and Turkmenistan.[1] According to another author, Khurasan is a term for a historical region spanning northeastern and eastern Iran and parts of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and northwestern Pakistan.[2]
  3. These traditions are attributed as prophecies to the Prophet Muhammad himself, peace be upon him, thus giving them a powerful resonance in the minds of many devout Muslims who hear them; in particular, modern extremist and terrorist groups regularly quote them.
  4. The traditions were first written down around the 3rd/9th century.
  5. From the earliest times until today, most Hadith scholars regarded these traditions as fabricated Abbasid propaganda that was never uttered by the Prophet. Some Hadith scholars, ignoring their historical context, accepted them as authentic teachings of the Prophet.
  6. During the century-long period of Umayyad rule, the idea of a messianic Mahdi became popular amongst rival Alid and Abbasids (descendants of Ali and Abbas, respectively) and their supporters. Abbasid propaganda in favour of their eventual overthrow of Umayyad rule included many references to the Mahdi, including fabricated hadiths claiming him as an Abbasid in response to the widespread view of him being Alid.
  7. The main Abbasid military commander who led the overthrow of the Umayyads in the 2nd/8th century, was from Khorasan, as his name signifies: Abu Muslim al-Khurasani (c. 700-755).[3] History records that his armies carried black flags or banners, cf. the histories by Tabari, Ibn Kathir, Dhahabi, Ibn Khaldun, Suyuti, etc.
  8. Based on traditional scrutiny of the hadiths’ chains of transmission (isnadsriwayah) as well as rational considerations of history (dirayah), it is the author’s firm conclusion that these hadiths were Abbasid propaganda fabricated 100-150 years after the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, and are in no way true Muhammadan prophecies.
  9. The author was preceded in this view by his father, Sheikh Dr. Suhaib Hasan, who took this view in his PhD thesis: The Concept of the Mahdi amongst Ahl al-Sunna (Sunni Muslims), including a translation of the chapter on the Mahdi from Nu’aym bin Hammad’s Kitab al-Fitan (Book of Tribulations).  Nu’aym bin Hammad is generally agreed to be a weak authority by Hadith scholars, so it is unfortunate that some contemporary writers, speakers and preachers are uncomprehendingly-quoting clearly-fabricated “prophecies” from the Kitab al-Fitan and applying them to current events in Iraq and the Levant! (These fabrications repeatedly mention the “Sufyani” i.e. Umayyad, the Mahdi and real historical figures such as Saffah.)  Rather than dealing with the very real religious, ideological, political and social causes of the current crisis, it is much easier to say, “These are the end times.  This was all prophesied.”
  10. Contemporary Muslim preachers and activists should acknowledge and explain that these hadiths are at the least doubtful and disputed, if not clear fabrications, especially when they are often misused by contemporary extremist and terrorist groups.

 

2. FABRICATED HADITHS: PRO- AND ANTI- ABBASID PROPAGANDA

There are numerous fabricated (mawdu’) hadiths both in favour and against the Abbasid armies from Khurasan that appeared with black flags in the second century of Islam. This illustrates how hadiths were fabricated for use as propaganda by both sides.

2.1        Pro-Abbasid fabrications

 

  1. Fabrication, falsely attributed to the Prophet: “The Mahdi will be a descendant of my uncle ‘Abbas.” – related by Daraqutni[4]
  2. Fabrication, falsely attributed to the Prophet: “O ‘Abbas! God opened this matter by me and will seal it by a young man from your descendants who will fill the world with justice as it had been filled with tyranny. He is the one who will lead Jesus in prayer.” – related by Khatib Baghdadi in Tarikh Baghdad [“The History of Baghdad”][5]
  3. Fabrication, falsely attributed to the Prophet: “Should I not give you good tidings [O ‘Abbas]? God opened this matter by me and will seal it by your descendant.” – related by Abu Nu’aym in Hilyah al-Awliya’ [“Adornment of the Saints”][6]
  4. Khatib Baghdadi transmitted a fabrication, falsely attributed to Ibn Abbas: “When the black flags emerge, bid the Persians well, for our rule [dawlah, also meaning ‘state’] will be with them.”[7]
  5. Fabrication, falsely attributed to the Prophet: “O Abbas! When year thirty-five comes, it [the rule] will be for you and your descendants. Amongst them will be the Slayer (al-Saffah), and amongst them will be the One Helped to Victory (al-Mansur), and amongst them will be the Guided One (al-Mahdi).”[8]

2.2        Anti-Abbasid fabrications

 

  1. Fabrication, falsely attributed to the Prophet: “The flags of the descendants of Abbas have come from Khurasan, signifying the death of Islam. Whoever marches under their banner will not benefit from my intercession on the Day of Resurrection.”[9]
  2. Fabrication, falsely attributed to the Prophet: “When the black flags appear from the east: their beginning is strife, their middle period is killing, their end period is misguidance.”[10]
  3. Fabrication, falsely attributed to the Prophet: “Woe to my nation from the descendants of Abbas! … Their destruction will be at the hands of one of her household [the Umayyads],” pointing to Umm Habiba [daughter of Abu Sufyan and sister of Mu’awiya, the first Umayyad caliph][11]

 

3. WEAK HADITHS ABOUT THE BLACK FLAGS OR BANNERS FROM KHURASAN

[Below, I use the following notation for hadith isnads, first introduced by my father in his PhD thesis on Hadith: == denotes a strong mode of transmission, such as haddathana (he narrated to us) or akhbarana (he informed us), whilst – denotes a weak mode such as ‘an (“on the authority of”)]

  1. Sunan Ibn Majah, Kitab al-Fitan (Book of Tribulations), Chapter: Emergence of the Mahdi (Guided One), Hadith no. 4082[12] Ibn Majah == ‘Uthman b. Abi Shaybah == Mu’awiyah b. Hisham == ‘Ali b. Salih – Yazid b. Abi Ziyad – Ibrahim [al-Nakh’i] – ‘Alqamah – ‘Abdullah [b. Mas’ud], who said: Whilst we were with the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, some young men of Banu Hashim arrived. When the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, saw them his eyes flooded with tears and his colour changed. I asked, “Why do we continue to see something undesirable in your face?” He replied, “Truly, we the People of the House:[13] God has chosen the Hereafter for us over this world. The people of my house will face calamity, dispersal and exile after me until a group of people come from the east with black banners. They will ask for goodness [i.e. authority] but will not be granted it, so they will fight and achieve victory. They will then be given what they asked for [i.e. authority] but will not accept it until they assign it to a man of my house who will fill the earth with justice as others had filled it with tyranny. Whoever amongst you is alive at the time should go to them, even if he has to crawl over snow.” Albani declares this hadith to be weak.[14] Sindi, the commentator on this hadith, states: Ibn Kathir said that this indicates the kingdom of the Banu ‘Abbas [Abbasids]. However, this is precluded by his saying, “He will fill it with justice,” clearly referring to the promised Mahdi, which is why the author included this hadith in this chapter, and God knows best what is correct. [Haythami states] in al-Zawa’id, “Its chain of narration is weak because of the weakness of Yazid b. Abi Ziyad of Kufa, although he was not alone in narrating it from Ibrahim, for Hakim has related it in al-Mustadrak via ‘Umar b. Qays – Hakam – Ibrahim.”[End of quote from Sindi]
  2. Sunan Ibn Majah, Kitab al-Fitan (Book of Tribulations), Chapter: Emergence of the Mahdi (Guided One), Hadith no. 4084[15] Ibn Majah === Muhammad b. Yahya and Ahmad b. Yusuf === ‘Abd al-Razzaq [al-San’ani] — Sufyan al-Thawri — Khalid al-Hadhdha’ — Abu Qilabah — Abu Asma’ al-Rahbi — Thawban, who said:The Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, said, “Three people, each of them the son of a caliph, will fight over your treasure. It will go to none of them. Then, the black flags will appear from the east: they will kill you with a slaughter not meted out (or faced) by any people.” He then mentioned something that I do not remember. Then he said, “When you see him [their leader], pledge allegiance to him, even if you have to crawl over snow, for he is the vicegerent (caliph of God), the Guided One [al-Mahdi].”Sindi, the commentator on this hadith, says:“Over your treasure,” i.e. “over your kingdom.” Ibn Kathir said, “The apparent meaning of the treasure mentioned is that it is the treasure of the Ka’bah.”“Then, the black flags will appear”: Ibn Kathir said, “These [armies with] black flags are not the ones that Abu Muslim of Khurasan brought, by which he toppled the Umayyad state. Rather, they are other black flags that will accompany the Mahdi, whose appearance is one of the Conditions of the Hour [i.e. Signs of the end of the world and the Day of Judgment].”[Haythami states] in al-Zawa’id, “Its chain of narration is sound; its narrators are reliable. Al-Hakim narrated it in al-Mustadrak and said: It is authentic (sahih) according to the conditions of the two shaykhs [i.e. Bukhari and Muslim].”[End of quote from Sindi]
  3. Sunan al-Tirmidhi, Kitab al-Fitan (Book of Tribulations), Hadith no. 2269[16] Tirmidhi == Qutaybah === Rishdin b. Sa’d — Yunus — Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri — Qabisah b. Dhu’ayb — Abu Hurayrah, who said:The Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, said, “From Khurasan will emerge black flags: nothing will repulse them until they are planted in Jerusalem.” This is a strange (gharib) hadith. Thus, Imam Tirmidhi declared it to be a weak hadith by describing it only as gharib (“strange”, having links as narrow as one narrator in its chain). Albani also declared its chain of narration (isnad) to be weak (da’if). Mubarakpuri, in his commentary on Tirmidhi, confirms that the black flags refer to military banners at the heads of armies. He also elaborates on Tirmidhi’s statement, “This is a strange (gharib) hadith” as follows: “In its chain is Rishdin b. Sa’d, who is weak. In the chain of the hadith of Thawban in Musnad Ahmad [i.e. the hadith of Ibn Mas’ud, below] there is Shurayk b. Abdullah the Qadi, whose memory declined after he took the position of judge in Kufah. It also contains Ali b. Zayd, who would appear to be Ibn Jud’an, and there is some talk about him.”

3.1        Shawkani’s brief analysis[17]

 

Al-Azadi related from Ibn Mas’ud from the Prophet, “When the black flags come from Khurasan, go to them, for truly amongst them is the caliph of God, the Mahdi.”

 

Ibn al-Jawzi said, “It has no basis,” and mentioned it amongst the fabricated traditions.

 

Ibn Hajar said in al-Qawl al-Musaddad [fi l-Dhabb ‘an Musnad al-Imam Ahmad, The Accurate Word in Defence of the Musnad of the Imam Ahmad], “Ibn al-Jawzi was not correct, for Ahmad has transmitted it via ‘Ali bin Zayd bin Jud’an who is weak but was not an intentional liar such that the hadith should be classified as fabricated when he alone narrates it. How more so, then, when his narration has been supported via a different route? This has been transmitted by Ahmad and by Bayhaqi in Dala’il [al-Nubuwwa, Indications of Prophethood] from the hadith of Abu Hurayra from the Prophet, ‘Black flags will come from Khurasan, that will not be stopped until they are planted in Jerusalem.’ In its chain of narration is Rishdin bin Sa’d, who is weak.”

 

3.2        Albani’s analysis of this hadith[18]

 

In another narration of this hadith: “When you see that the black flags have come out of Khurasan, go to them even if you have to crawl …” to the end of the hadith.[19] These narrations were transmitted by Ahmad, Ibn Majah and Hakim.

 

Ibn al-Jawzi included the hadith in his collection of fabricated (mawdu’) hadiths; Dhahabi said that it was rejected (munkar). Imam Ahmad’s isnad includes ‘Ali b. Zayd b. Jud’an: Ahmad, Ibn Hajar, Munawi and others agreed that he is a weak narrator. Ibn Hajar said about Ibn al-Jawzi’s judgment, “He is not correct, because none of the narrators is accused of lying.” Albani agrees with Dhahabi that the hadith is rejected (munkar).

 

Ibn al-Jawzi’s isnad for this hadith is via ‘Amr b. Qays — Hasan — Abu ‘Ubaydah — ‘Abdullah [b. Mas’ud] — the Prophet (pbuh). Ibn al-Jawzi stated, “This has no basis: ‘Amr is nothing, and did not hear hadiths from Hasan; Hasan did not hear hadiths from Abu ‘Ubaydah.” Albani adds, “And Abu ‘Ubaydah did not hear hadiths from his father, Ibn Mas’ud … Haythami said in al-Zawa’id (249/2), ‘Its chain is authentic; the narrators are reliable.’ Hakim said, ‘It is authentic according to the conditions of the two shaykhs [Bukhari and Muslim].’ Dhahabi agreed with Hakim, although he said in the Mizan [al-I’tidal] that the hadith is rejected (munkar); the latter is correct. Those who authenticated this hadith overlooked its subtle defect, which is the ‘an’anah (ambiguous mode of reporting) of Abu Qilabah – he was known to conceal some of his authorities (tadlis), as is quoted from Dhahabi and others.”

 

Albani goes on to say, “However, the hadith is correct in meaning apart from the statement, ‘… for amongst them is the vicegerent of God [khalifat Allah], the Mahdi,’ for it has been transmitted by Ibn Majah (2/517) via ‘Alqamah from Ibn Mas’ud from the Prophet (pbuh), similarly to Thawban’s second narration. Its chain of narration is good (hasan), and does not include the phrase ‘vicegerent of God [khalifat Allah]’.”

 

3.2.1        [Ibn Taymiyya on the allegedly blasphemous nature of the term, “caliph of God”]

 

Albani continues:

 

This addition, ‘vicegerent of God [khalifat Allah],’ does not have an established route of narration, nor a supporting one. Thus it is rejected (munkar – a weak narration that contradicts authentic ones) as follows from Dhahabi’s statement quoted earlier. Part of its abhorrence is that it is not permissible in religion to refer to someone as ‘vicegerent of God’ [khalifat Allah] because that implies a shortcoming and incapacity that does not befit God the Exalted. The Shaykh of Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, may God Exalted have mercy upon him, explained this in his Fatwas (2/461):

 

‘Some mistaken commentators, such as Ibn Arabi, thought that the vicegerent [the function of khalifah attributed to Adam in Qur’an 2:30] is a vicegerent on behalf of God, like God’s deputy. But God Exalted cannot have a vicegerent, and that is why when they said to Abu Bakr, “O caliph (vicegerent) of God!” he replied, “I am not the caliph (vicegerent) of God, but the caliph (vicegerent) of the Messenger of God – that is sufficient for me.”[20] Rather, it is He, may He be glorified, Who is the vicegerent of others: the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, prayed, “Dear God! You are the Companion during a journey, and the vicegerent amongst family. Dear God, please accompany us during our journey and deputise for us amongst our families!” This is because God is the Living, Ever-Present Witness, Guardian, Self-Subsisting, Observer, Safeguarder, Independent of the Worlds, needing no partner or supporter, and none can intercede before Him except by His permission. A vicegerent or deputy only occurs when the one whose place is taken is non-existent due to death or absence, such that a deputy called a vicegerent is required … all of these meanings are impossible regarding God the Exalted, and He is absolved of them, for He is the Living, Self-Subsisting, Ever-Present Witness who does not die or become absent … It is not possible for anyone to deputise for Him or to take His place, for He has no equal or anyone worthy of His name: whoever attributes a deputy or vicegerent to Him is associating a partner with Him.’[21]

3.3        Conclusion

Note that none of the hadith scholars quoted above took the historical record into account, basing their discussions purely on the chains of narrators and thus reaching opposite conclusions, with some authenticating these traditions and others doubting them severely. From the history of the Abbasid armies from the east, specifically Khurasan, led by black banners, it would appear to be obvious that all these supposedly prophetic traditions are in fact fabrications.

 

 

4. CONTEMPORARY PROPAGANDA ABOUT BLACK FLAGS

The use of black flags is an ancient Eastern, Arab and Islamic tradition. Its significance has changed over the centuries. Below is a summary of recent developments.

4.1        The Ottomans

Some people believe that one of the Prophet’s original banners, known as the Uqab, was black, that it eventually passed to the Ottomans and that remnants of it are housed at the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul.[22]

4.2        Bin Ladin

Usama bin Ladin often signed his name with the location, “Khurasan, Afghanistan” at the end of his messages whilst a guest of the Taliban. His organisation, Al-Qa’ida, also specifically adopted black flags from the 1990s. Reading between the lines, it is obvious that Bin Ladin saw Al-Qa’ida as fulfilling a sacred prophecy, bringing armies led by black flags towards Damascus and Jerusalem, in preparation for the coming of the messianic figure, the Mahdi.

4.3        The Taliban

According to one contemporary writer, “Very interestingly, the Taliban hail from the Pashtun ethnicity and have traditionally used two flags, a white flag with a black Shahada (Kalma) embossed for their government and diplomatic purposes and a reversal of this i.e. a black flag with a white Shahada embossed for their military. These types of black flags are also vividly seen across the tribal Pashtun areas that are now reportedly under the control of Pakistani Taliban.”[23]

4.4        Harmajdun (Armageddon)

This influential, populist book authored by an Egyptian Azhari sheikh in 2001 quoted some of these fabricated hadiths.[24] One in particular that begins, “There will be strife at the death of a caliph …” was interpreted to refer to the impending death of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the black flags were taken to refer to the black turbans of the Taliban. The book also claimed to be based on recently-discovered manuscripts of hadith, some of which were said to predict the 1990-1 war between Iraq and the US over Kuwait: the hadiths were said to mention a place called “little Kut” which is the literal meaning of “Kuwait.” Although popular amongst the masses, this book was dismissed by serious scholars of hadith and history.

4.5        Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT)

HT adopted a black flag with the Islamic declaration of faith, possibly from its inception. Recently, this has led to confusion between HT flags and ISIS flags.[25] On one of HT’s public, international discussion forums, there is a lengthy discussion between October 2009 and October 2010 about the authenticity of the hadiths of the black flags, the coming of the Mahdi and the re-establishment of the caliphate, with a suggestion that the black flags refer to the Taliban.[26]

4.6        The Boston Bombers

Four months before carrying out the Boston bombings of 2013 along with another suspect, Tamerlan Tsarnaev appears to have “liked” and shared a video on YouTube entitled, The Emergence of Prophecy: The Black Flags From Khorasan (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uJknGtKV34I).[27] This video claims about the hadiths mentioned in it that “majority of scholars say is authentic and others say is weak [sic].”

4.7        The Ahmadiyya

Some of the Ahmadiyya refer these hadiths to their founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, due to his Persian ancestry. One of their writers says, “Black Flag of Khorasan … Thawban (ra) narrated that the Prophet (sa) said: ‘If you see the black banners emerging from Khurasan (Persia), seek to join their supporters even if creeping, because among them will be caliph Al-Mahdi.’ (Sunan Ibn Majah, Vol. 3, 4084) This flag is the flag of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community today (contrary to popular belief it is not the flag of any Jihadist groups since this flag would be for the followers of the Mahdi).”[28]

4.8        Contemporary Jihadist groups

In the modern era, black flags with the Islamic declaration of faith have become very popular amongst Jihadist and other Islamist groups. For example: Al-Qaeda, al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in Iraq, Jihadist fighters in Chechnya and of course the self-styled “Islamic State,” formerly “The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) have all adopted black flags, with white Arabic writing consisting of the basic Islamic declarations of faith (the shahadatayn), as their emblems. The extremist but non-Jihadist international group, Hizb al-Tahrir, also employs a black flag with white shahadatayn, as its emblem. All these groups occasionally reverse these colours: a black flag for war; a white flag for peace. A white flag with black shahadatayn was especially adopted by the Taliban in Afghanistan for peacetime.

ISIS have recently adopted a black flag with white writing: an ancient-looking script for the first shahada, with the second shahada in the form of a seal, based upon the hadiths mentioning the Prophet’s own seal and ring. No-one knows for sure what the script on this seal looked like, but the form adopted by ISIS (and al-Shabab and Boko Haram) has ironically been popularised over the past two decades by populists such as the unscientific Turkish writer, Harun Yahya (Adnan Oktar).

Minor article edits: 11th September, 2014

FOOTNOTES

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khurasan (accessed 9 Sep 2013)

[2] See Charles Cameron, Ali Soufan: AQ, Khorasan and the Black Banners, http://zenpundit.com/?p=4322

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Muslim_Khorasani (accessed 9 Sep 2013)

[4] Albani, Silsilah al-Ahadith al-Da’ifah, 4th ed., al-Maktab al-Islami, Beirut/Damascus, 1398, vol. 1 p. 108, no. 80

[5] Albani, Silsilah al-Ahadith al-Da’ifah, 4th ed., al-Maktab al-Islami, Beirut/Damascus, 1398, vol. 1 p. 109, no. 81

[6] Albani, Silsilah al-Ahadith al-Da’ifah, 4th ed., al-Maktab al-Islami, Beirut/Damascus, 1398, vol. 1 pp. 109-110, no. 82

[7] Shawkani, al-Fawa’id al-Majmu’ah fi l-Ahadith al-Mawdu’ah [Collected Insights about Fabricated Traditions], Book of Praiseworthy Qualities, Chapter: Virtues of the Four Caliphs, the Prophet’s Household and the Rest of the Companions, Generally and Specifically, may God be pleased with them, and Virtues of Other People –hadith no. 1010, http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&hflag=1&pid=530423&bk_no=1015&startno=167

[8] Shawkani, al-Fawa’id al-Majmu’ah fi l-Ahadith al-Mawdu’ah [Collected Insights about Fabricated Traditions], Book of Praiseworthy Qualities, Chapter: Virtues of the Four Caliphs, the Prophet’s Household and the Rest of the Companions, Generally and Specifically, may God be pleased with them, and Virtues of Other People –hadith no. 1015, http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&hflag=1&pid=530423&bk_no=1015&startno=172 This is a very clear fabrication, since the three titles mentioned were adopted by the first three Abbasid caliphs.

[9] Shawkani, al-Fawa’id al-Majmu’ah fi l-Ahadith al-Mawdu’ah [Collected Insights about Fabricated Traditions], Book of Praiseworthy Qualities, Chapter: Virtues of the Four Caliphs, the Prophet’s Household and the Rest of the Companions, Generally and Specifically, may God be pleased with them, and Virtues of Other People –hadith no. 1009, http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&hflag=1&pid=530423&bk_no=1015&startno=166

[10] Shawkani, al-Fawa’id al-Majmu’ah fi l-Ahadith al-Mawdu’ah [Collected Insights about Fabricated Traditions], Book of Praiseworthy Qualities, Chapter: Virtues of the Four Caliphs, the Prophet’s Household and the Rest of the Companions, Generally and Specifically, may God be pleased with them, and Virtues of Other People –hadith no. 1011, http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&hflag=1&pid=530423&bk_no=1015&startno=168

[11] Shawkani, al-Fawa’id al-Majmu’ah fi l-Ahadith al-Mawdu’ah [Collected Insights about Fabricated Traditions], Book of Praiseworthy Qualities, Chapter: Virtues of the Four Caliphs, the Prophet’s Household and the Rest of the Companions, Generally and Specifically, may God be pleased with them, and Virtues of Other People –hadith no. 1014, http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&hflag=1&pid=530423&bk_no=1015&startno=171

[12] http://hadith.al-islam.com/Page.aspx?pageid=192&BookID=35&TOCID=1534

[13] Ahl al-Bayt: a phrase referring to the Prophet’s immediate family and descendants

[14] Ibn Majah, Sunan, ed. Albani & Mashhur Hasan Salman, Maktabah al-Ma’arif, Riyadh, 1417 H, hadith no. 4082. According to Shawkani (hadith no. 1013), a very similar hadith is transmitted by Hakim and Abu l-Shaykh, and includes the addition describing the flags or banners as “flags of guidance.” http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&hflag=1&pid=530423&bk_no=1015&startno=170

[15] http://hadith.al-islam.com/Page.aspx?pageid=192&TOCID=1534&BookID=35&PID=7508

[16] Tirmidhi, Sunan, ed. Albani & Mashhur Hasan Salman, Maktabah al-Ma’arif, Riyadh, 1417 H, hadith no. 2269; http://hadith.al-islam.com/Page.aspx?pageid=192&TOCID=1532&BookID=37&PID=4328

[17] Shawkani, al-Fawa’id al-Majmu’ah fi l-Ahadith al-Mawdu’ah [Collected Insights about Fabricated Traditions], Book of Praiseworthy Qualities, Chapter: Virtues of the Four Caliphs, the Prophet’s Household and the Rest of the Companions, Generally and Specifically, may God be pleased with them, and Virtues of Other People – Mention of Mu’awiya, hadith no. 1012 http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&hflag=1&pid=530423&bk_no=1015&startno=169

[18] Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Silsilah al-Ahadith al-Da’ifah wa l-Mawdu’ah wa atharuha l-sayyi’ fi l-ummah, al-Maktab al-Islami, Beirut/Damascus, 4th ed., 1398 H, vol. 1, hadith no. 85, pp. 119-121

[19] This narration is also mentioned by al-‘Ajluni, Kashf al-Khafa’, no. 241 – where he simply says, “Related by Ahmad and Hakim on the authority of Thawban.”

[20] Related by Ahmad similarly in the Musnad (1/10-11)

[21] Although Ibn Taymiyya was responding to what he saw as the neo-incarnationist Sufi notions of Ibn Arabi, the same critique has been applied since the 20th century to the over-politicisation of the Qur’anic term “caliph/vicegerent” by the ideologues of political Islam such as Mawdudi and Qutb, cf. Jaafar Sheikh Idris, IS MAN THE VICEGERENT OF GOD? Journal of Islamic Studies (1990) 1 (1): 99-110, Oxford

[22] See e.g. The Wake-Up Project, Ukab- banner of our Prophet Muhammad (saas), http://wup-forum.com/ukab-banner-of-our-prophet-muhammad-saas-t12620.html. See also a YouTube video featuring a supposed still of this banner accompanied by Islamic songs, and tellingly uploaded by “Abu Muslim Khurasani” at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rg8XkGzaMcI

[23] Black Banners From Khurasan: The Bilad-e-Khurasan in Making, Research Paper by Bilal Khan, March 30th, 2008 http://www.grandestrategy.com/2009/06/research-paper-by-bilal-khan-paper-is.html

[24] For an Urdu translation of this book, see https://archive.org/details/Harmajdoon

[25] See Seth Frantzman, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC ‘BLACK FLAG’ IN JERUSALEM, 10th August 2014, http://sethfrantzman.com/2014/08/10/a-short-history-of-the-islamic-black-flag-in-the-holy-land/

[26] See discussion thread, Black flags In Khorasan, http://forum.hizbuttahrir.org/showthread.php?2599-Black-flags-In-Khorasan

[27] For more information, see Adam Serwer, Did Boston Bombing Suspect Post Al Qaeda Prophecy on YouTube?, Mother Jones, 19th April 2013, http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/04/boston-bombing-suspect-posted-video-al-qaeda-prophecy-youtube

[28] SIGNS OF MIRZA GHULAM AHMAD (AS) AS THE MAHDI AND MESSIAH, 28th June 2014, http://mysticscientist.wordpress.com/2014/06/28/signs-of-mirza-ghulam-ahmad-as-as-the-mahdi-and-messiah/

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The Siege of Mecca – a brief book review

November 23, 2013

Bismillah.

The Siege of Mecca – The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine by Yaroslav Trofimov (Penguin, 2008)

A must-read book for anyone interested in its topics. Based on detailed journalism (the author is a WSJ writer and lists his detailed sources at the end, including classified CIA material obtained via FIRs and interviews with eyewitnesses and participants in the bloody drama), yet written like a novel. Gripping, unputdownable.

Featuring Juhayman al-Utaybi (leader of the rebels, whose father or grandfather had fought in the Battle of Sbala for the puritanical Ikhwan against their former ally King Abdulaziz), Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Qahtani (“The Mahdi”), Sheikhs Ibn Baz and Subayyil (Subeil in the book), the Saudi King Khalid and senior princes, an Arab League Summit, President Carter and Brzezinski, General Zia, Ayatollah Khomeini & others.

The rebels took over the Sacred Mosque (al-Masjid al-Haram) at the beginning of the new Islamic year on 1 Muharram 1400 / 20 November 1979, i.e. 35/34 yrs ago this month/week, depending on which calendar we use. The siege lasted two weeks until Saudi forces recaptured Islam’s holiest site. Hundreds of civilian pilgrims were killed, caught in the crossfire. At least 127 Saudi soldiers were killed, including a bloodbath in the Safa-Marwa gallery where they were ambushed during their initial, failed attempts to defeat the rebels. Dozens of rebels were also killed; 63 of those who were captured were beheaded publicly in 8 Saudi cities. The rebels included a son of the Pakistani hadith scholar, Sheikh Badiuddin Sindhi. A few teenage rebels, who had accompanied their older brothers, were spared execution but served long jail sentences, and are now back in Saudi society. Some of them were sources for Trofimov’s account.

Contrary to widespread rumours, French commandos did not fight in Mecca, but three of them planned from nearby Taif the final operation for the Saudis to recapture the Sacred Mosque.

For those who have been to Mecca, this book will forever change your memory of the place. Some of the details of the slaughter are very painful.

Anti-American feeling, fuelled by rumours that the Mecca outrage was a US-Israeli conspiracy, swept across the Muslim world, with US embassies attacked in Islamabad and Tripoli. Sound familiar?

1979 was a dramatic year: the Iranian Revolution had happened in Feb and there was a Shia uprising in Eastern Saudi at the same time as the Mecca incident, inspired by Juhayman and Khomeini. Some of the Shia spoke of “Mujahid Juhayman,” not knowing that he hated them for sectarian reasons. The USSR invaded Afghanistan at the end of the year (25 December 1979).

Some of the seeds of Al-Qaeda were sown in 1979: the rebels had essentially the same ideology as their counterparts who rose to prominence two decades later on 9/11. In salafi/jihadi circles, Muqbil bin Hadi (the Yemeni hadith scholar, in his book al-Makhraj min al-Fitnah [The Way Out of Strife]) and Bin Ladin accused the Saudis of being more oppressive than the rebels.

Khalid Islambuli, who assassinated President Sadat of Egypt two years later, was inspired by his brother who was with Juhayman in Mecca. Sadat was assassinated on 6 October 1981, which corresponded to 9 Dhul Hijjah 1401, i.e. the Day of ‘Arafah during the Hajj. (Last year, our Hajj group included a British-Egyptian medical doctor who had last performed the Hajj in 1401/1981. He told me that the pilgrims had received the momentous news about Sadat at ‘Arafah and had been split, especially the Egyptian pilgrims, between mourning and rejoicing.)

According to Trofimov, Saudi Arabia was actually liberalising in the early 1970s under King Faisal (with female TV presenters etc) but in return for ulama support for government action against the rebels, they reversed that after 1979.

One minor factual error: Trofimov describes the C-shaped low wall on the opposite side of the Kaaba to the Black Stone, Yemeni Corner and Station of Abraham as the “Rukn.” This is incorrect: the wall is called the “Hateem.” The rebels pledged allegiance to their Mahdi “between the Rukn [Pillar] and Station [of Abraham]” in accordance with a prophecy found in hadiths of dubious authenticity. My father, whose PhD thesis at Birmingham University was on the Sunni concept of the Mahdi, confirmed that the “Rukn” in this (dubious) hadith refers to the Black Stone, so the pledge was done between the Black Stone and the Station of Abraham.

This minor error aside, the book is brilliant.

Rare footage of some of the siege may be found in videos available online.

Usama Hasan, https://unity1.wordpress.com

Bin Ladin: From Hero to Villain

May 22, 2011

Bismillah.

BIN LADIN: FROM HERO TO VILLAIN?

Usama bin Muhammad bin ‘Awad bin Ladin (1957-2011) was originally a hero of the Afghan Jihad against the decade-long Soviet occupation, leading Arab and other fighters in numerous, successful operations. He was a colleague and deputy of the Palestinian Jihad leader Abdullah Azzam.  Once upon a time, the US was indebted to him for helping to inflict a major defeat on their superpower rival, as he was to them for their support of that Jihad.  But the plain truth is that his “Jihad” later evolved into international terrorism and consistently violated basic Islamic and human ethics.

Whether it’s the barbarity of the modern warfare waged by nation-states or international terrorism, it is all inhuman.  Let’s not forget that the twentieth century was the bloodiest in history, with governments all over the world guilty of collectively killing millions of people using increasingly-destructive weapons technology.  To illustrate the irony, when President Clinton reacted to Ibn Ladin’s assassination by referring to a long series of murderous attacks, he could have easily been talking about the ongoing US drone strikes in Pakistan that have killed hundreds of civilians.

Those interested in Ibn Ladin the man may wish to refer especially to two detailed interviews that he gave to ABC News and Al-Jazeera before 9/11.  In the ABC news interview, he condemned unprovoked terrorism but justified terrorism “against tyrants and oppressors in retaliation for their killing of innocent people.”  He also referred to the influential “younger” Saudi clerics, then in prison, as his mentors: the two leading ones, Salman al-‘Awdah and Safar al-Hawali, distanced themselves from him after 9/11 and criticised Al-Qaidah’s tactics.

To Al-Jazeera, Ibn Ladin spoke of his father’s civil engineering work and mentioned that his father was sometimes able to offer prayers in the three holiest mosques in a single day, i.e. in Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, since his father’s company, the Saudi Bin Ladin Group (not to be confused with an Al-Qaidah cell) had the maintenance and renovation contracts at all three sites.  He also said, in a clear recruitment appeal, that the optimum age for Jihad fighters was from adulthood to about 35, but appeared to dodge the question as to whether or not he was involved in the 1989 assassination of Abdullah Azzam, in which other suspects include the KGB, KHAD, Hekmatyar, Zawahiri and Mossad.

Since his death, the praise for Ibn Ladin from some Islamists around the world may be largely based on those early days, since tens of thousands took part in that anti-Communist Jihad. (I did so briefly, Dec 1990 – Jan 1991 during Cambridge University’s undergraduate winter holidays, along with two other senior colleagues from the UK.) Unfortunately, his supporters seem to have forgotten, or ignored, what came next.

The Afghan mujahideen were largely religious and/or nationalist, and bitterly-divided, as the vicious civil war amongst them illustrated, 1992-6 after the fall of Kabul, until the Taliban disarmed the warlords and took power, heralding merely the latest in a long line of brutally violent phases that the Afghan people have endured over the last 30-40 years.

The Arab fighters tended to be pan-Islamist, and many were not able to return to their countries of origin, mainly ruled by Western-backed dictators and tyrants. The Islamists’ anti-Westernism was compounded by western support for Israel in its numerous conflicts with the Arabs. Their influence has been huge.  (Many Muslims today, even Western ones, still speak of “Islam and the West” instead of “Islam in the West.”)

After the fall of Kabul, many Arab mujahideen fought in Bosnia and later Chechnya.  A widespread idea in mujahideen circles was that these wars in Europe confirmed the teaching attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), that “Jihad will continue until the Day of Resurrection” – Bosnia erupted soon after the fall of Kabul, and Chechnya followed closely.  Unfortunately, the Jihadists seemed unable to conceptualise non-violent, peaceful Jihads or struggles, e.g. those against colonial occupation, racism, apartheid, gender- or caste-discrimination, social injustice and poverty, that many peoples around the world have waged over the last century or so.

Once the Soviets, Serbs and Russians were no longer the leading targets in this “Jihad against all non-believers,” it was the turn of the western nations, led by the US.  Ibn Ladin issued a nonsensical Fatwa at the end of the 1990’s, as he launched Al-Qaidah or the International Islamic Front Against the Alliance of Crusaders and Zionists, or whatever he called it.  The fatwa said that all western taxpayers, and especially Americans, were legitimate targets due to western support for Israel, and thus sought to justify international terrorism.  The core part of the fatwa was read out on live, national UK television (BBC Newsnight) by a hate-preaching, extremist cleric who has since been banned from Britain.

Then came a string of atrocities against the US and people of many other nations: the embassy bombings in East Africa, and 9/11.  There is now clearly-overwhelming evidence that Al-Qaidah carried out the 9/11 attacks, although there remain a number of unanswered questions, including whether or not some people outside Al-Qaidah knew of the plots and could have done more to foil them.

The 9/11 attacks were, regrettably, celebrated across parts of the Muslim world and Latin America, exposing the level of anti-US sentiment.  Arab media reported a spike in baby boys being named “Usama” and there was a surge in Al-Qaidah’s popularity that dissipated over the years as the organisation murdered more and more innocent people, most of them Muslims, in many countries.  A notable exception to the initial celebration was in Iran, where there was no love for the fanatically anti-Shi’ite Al-Qaidah and Taliban.  Protestors in Tehran chanted, “Condolences to America,” instead of the usual chant of “Death to America” that has become regular since the 1979 revolution.

Many people wonder how someone likened to Hitler in some parts of the world could have been so popular elsewhere.  They forget that a certain US President is similarly hated in parts of the Muslim world:  the award-winning journalist Robert Fisk is a witness to that, having been beaten up and left for dead in December 2001 by an Afghan mob that mistook him for President Bush Jnr.  Similarly, others wonder how the Israelis once voted in General Ariel Sharon as their leader, despite an official Israeli inquiry finding him to be complicit in the 1982 massacre of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

The unfortunate western policy over the last few decades of supporting tyrants and dictators, whether military figures or absolute monarchs, as well as corrupt secular politicians, across the Arab and Muslim world, was partly to blame for Bin Ladin’s popularity there, as was the failure of those societies themselves to democratise. Of course the masses would choose a charismatic military hero, an eloquent warrior-poet, an ascetic from a billionaire family who renounced luxurious living and talked tough against Israel and America, backing his words with action, over utterly-corrupt kings, presidents and other dictators.  (Similarly, supporters of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and Mullah Omar point to their simple and ascetic lifestyles.  The Muslim world seems to have too many leaders who are either ungodly and corrupt or are religious fanatics.)  God bless the brave youth who have inspired the Arab spring, offering the hope of an escape from the madness on all sides over the last few generations, and forced western powers to admit the failure of their previous strategies.  The leaders of the Arab spring have engaged successfully in a peaceful Jihad, for the Prophet, peace be upon him, is said to have taught that “the best Jihad is to speak a word of truth to a tyrant ruler.”

Celebrating the misfortune of others, especially an enemy, is an unfortunately-common, but negative, human trait.  In Arabic, it is known as shamatat al-a’da’.  In the Qur’an, Prophet Aaron (Harun) begs Prophet Moses (Musa), peace be upon them, not to expose him to the rejoicing of enemies by criticising him publicly and the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, would pray for God’s protection from being the object of this vice.

But unfortunately, some Muslims celebrated 9/11 as a military victory, just as British tabloids had celebrated the bombing of Libya in 1986, some Israelis the Gaza offensive of 2008-9, and some New Yorkers the assassination of Bin Ladin earlier this month.

Such celebrations may also be attributable to a sense of justice and/or revenge, of course.  One of those celebrating in Times Square had lost his wife on 9/11 and declared to the cameras that he knew for sure that his wife would watch from heaven whilst God would throw Bin Ladin’s soul into the depths of hell.  This was a totally understandable reaction from the still-grieving widower, whilst some Jews and Christians, amongst many believers, were surely asking that difficult question, “Can God forgive Hitler or Bin Ladin?”  Later today, the congregation of a church in Florida will be praying for Bin Ladin’s forgiveness.

Meanwhile, the latter’s former sister-in-law, Carmen bin Ladin, told CNN that Saudi society would be grieving the death of their brother, whom they regarded as a good Muslim, since he upheld the five pillars of Islam.  A problem in Muslim society is that too often, a “good Muslim” man or woman is limited to someone who observes the five pillars and dresses in a certain way, whereas the five pillars are supposed to be the springboard that launch people into oceans of loving spirituality, humanity and generosity rather than reducing them to hate-filled fanaticism.  A “good Muslim” is one who, inspired by the love and worship of God, helps to transform society for the better, standing up for the dispossessed and downtrodden against their oppressors.  Muslim societies need internal Jihads against racism, inequality and religious fanaticism, amongst other things.

One or two Muslim theologians, whose attitudes can only be described as mediaevalist, have quickly pronounced that Ibn Ladin is in heaven, since for them, “any Muslim, no matter what his deeds, is better than any non-Muslim.”  This is reminiscent of the rhetoric of the extremist Jews who glorified Baruch Goldstein, the Israeli settler who massacred 29 Palestinians in 1994 as they worshipped at dawn at the Hebron mosque and Cave of the Patriarchs.  For example, one extremist rabbi declared that “a million Arabs are not worth a Jewish fingernail.”  Other extremists praised Goldstein for “living the Torah,” just as plenty of Muslim fanatics claim to be “following the Shariah.”  A wider irony is that Islamism and Zionism are mirror images of each other, united only in mutual hatred, since they both represent over-politicisations of their faiths.

The simple answer is that heaven and hell (or the Garden and the Fire, in Qur’anic language) manifest people’s nearness to God in this life: those in the Garden are near God and vice-versa, and those in the Fire are distant from God, and vice-versa.  Those insisting that Ibn Ladin is in the Garden should at least reflect on the possibility that many, if not all, of the innocent victims of terrorism are closer to God.

We face a stark choice today: in many ways, one that is as old as humanity itself.  We can either continue in cycles of violence and vengeance, or we can choose to break those cycles and embrace hope, forgiveness and peace.  Al-Qaidah are partly motivated by revenge for Muslim suffering over many years.  According to their stupid, clichéd and almost-meaningless slogan, “Americans will not taste security until the Palestinians do.” After 9/11, the US was partly motivated by revenge: “Who cares if we over-react!” as one TV pundit put it.  Ten years later, there are thousands of Al-Qaeda, Taliban, US and ISAF soldiers, plus Afghan, Pakistani and Iraqi civilians dead as part of the “war on terror.”  Furthermore, terrorists have left hundreds dead from Bali to London, Morocco to Jordan, Madrid to Mumbai.  How much more “revenge” do people want?

Zamakhshari, a classical commentator on the Qur’an, pointed out an oft-forgotten, basic aspect of Islam: the word itself means, as well as submission, “to enter into peace (after war)” – to put it another way, it means peace-making and renouncing war in favour of peace.  A true Muslim is thus a committed peace-maker and, as Prophet Jesus Christ, peace be upon him, is reported to have taught, “Blessed are the peace-makers.”

Fourteen centuries ago, Islam put an end to the vicious blood-feuds amongst the warring tribes of Arabia, cycles of violence that continued for generations.  Today, the South Africans, Northern Irish and the Rwandans, amongst others have chosen national reconciliation over continuing similar blood-feuds.  We need to encourage and help the Afghans, Pakistanis and Kashmiris to do the same.

President Obama’s efforts for a new chapter in US-Muslim relations must be welcomed, and we can all play a part in building bridges amongst people locked in conflict.  Crucially, the Israelis and Palestinians must be encouraged to end their mutual distrust and hatred.  The work of Ali Abu Awwad and Robi Damelin, showcased in the film, Encounter Point, must especially be commended.  Jews and Muslims living together peacefully in democratic western countries can help set an example to their fellow-believers in the Holy Land, traumatised by the decades of conflict, many of whom are not even aware that they worship the same God, revere the same Prophets, and share many aspects of language and religious practice.  Efforts towards Palestinian unity and democratisation must be welcomed, although militant religious extremism, both Muslim and Jewish, must be marginalised and exposed for what it is: a perversion of faith and an immense obstacle to Middle-Eastern and world peace.  Muslim and Jewish leaders and religious authorities around the world must especially make it a priority to help their colleagues in Palestine and Israel make the right choices on the path to peace and justice for all.  Influential religious authorities in places like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria must be given the independence and freedom to criticise their governments constructively and thus reclaim their role as reflecting the spiritual will of the people, rather than being forced and intimidated into always toeing the official line.

One of Ibn Ladin’s gravest mistakes, regrettably, was to pervert the nobility of Jihad, including his own earlier sacrifices, and to recast it in purely violent forms with the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians.  It is time for Muslims to reclaim the wider and deeper aspects of Jihad, for as Ibrahim bin Abi ‘Ablah, an ascetic Successor to the Companions of the Prophet, peace be upon him, observed on his way back from a military expedition, “We have returned from a lesser Jihad to the Greater Jihad: the struggle against the vices of our own souls.”  Let us put the last ten years behind us, and move on.

© Usama Hasan

London, UK

22nd May, 2011